With Selic at 14.75% per annum, a real stablecoin issuer that maintains 100% backing in Brazilian public securities generates, on every R$ 1 billion in circulation, approximately R$ 147.5 million per year in gross reserve returns. The token holder, in the vast majority of cases, receives zero. The difference goes entirely to the issuer, which transforms itself — without saying the name — into a fixed-income investment vehicle without offering returns to the investor.
It is one of the most profitable arrangements in the contemporary Brazilian financial market. And it is, simultaneously, the point that may determine whether private tokenized digital real survives competition from USDC integrated with PIX, USDT in growing domestic use, and DREX, or whether it simply loses relevance in the next 24 months. The decisive factor is a specific article in a bill: Article 13-E of Bill 4.308/2024, currently in proceedings before the Chamber of Deputies.
The provision, if approved in its current form, ensures that the distribution of returns by issuers of stablecoins backed by fiat currency is not classified as a public offering of securities. In regulatory language, it translates as follows: the CVM will have no legal basis to classify the stablecoin as an investment product, and the issuer that decides to pass on part or all of the reserve returns to the holder will not be required to register as a fund manager, quota distributor, or offeror of registered securities. It is the legal unblocking that separates the current model — issuer keeps the yield — from the competitive model — yield is a product variable.
The math that changes everything
The returns on Brazilian public securities that back real stablecoins currently operate at a level more than four times higher than US Treasuries that back USDT and USDC. This spread creates an unprecedented asymmetry of incentives internationally: the debate on yield pass-through in USD stablecoins remains partly theoretical because the marginal gain for the holder is modest. In Brazil, with Selic at 14.75%, the gain is not theoretical — it is capable of transforming the stablecoin into an asset competitive against CDB, Treasury Selic, and traditional DI funds.
The practical consequence is that the Brazilian issuer that passes on yield, even if partially, offers the holder something that no dollar-backed stablecoin can currently offer: a competitive local currency return rate with traditional fixed income, with 24/7 liquidity, no redemption window, programmable and custodied onchain. It is a value proposition that changes who is willing to maintain a balance in the stablecoin — retail investor, corporate treasury, cash flow manager.
Who passes on, who doesn't, who waits
The main real stablecoin issuers in Brazil currently occupy distinct positions in the debate:
- BRZ — Transfero: against direct distribution. The issuer's public thesis is that passing on reserve returns would transform the token into an investment instrument, requiring distinct regulatory classification and potentially eliminating operational advantages of the stablecoin as a payment method.
- BRLA — Avenia: in favor of distribution. Argues that the holder should have access to returns generated by the reserve and is positioned to offer this structure as soon as the legal barrier is removed.
- BRL1 — Mercado Bitcoin: middle ground. Sees viability in the model as long as there is appropriate legal framework — which is precisely what Bill 4.308 seeks to deliver.
- BRLV — Crown: indirect model. Accesses yield via secondary products (parallel instruments linked to the token) rather than distributing directly on the balance, circumventing the current regulatory problem without depending on Bill approval.
- Bloquo: supports distribution with a democratization argument — the thesis is that passing on Selic returns via stablecoin delivers to the unbanked retail a fixed-income product that historically is a privilege of those operating CDB or DI funds.
Alignment is far from unanimous. But the internal divergence is, in itself, an indicator: five relevant players feel the need to publicly position themselves on yield pass-through because they understand that the status quo is unsustainable when Selic is at 14.75%. In any scenario in which Bill 4.308 advances with Article 13-E preserved, at least three of them are ready to change the product within weeks.
What Central Bank Resolution 520 did — and what was missing
The Central Bank advanced in 2025 with the regulatory package composed of Central Bank Resolutions 519, 520 and 521. Resolution 520, in particular, restrictively defined what can be called "virtual asset referenced in fiat currency": requirement for full backing in fiat currency or in public debt securities, express prohibition of algorithmic stablecoins, prudential requirements for the issuer.
What Resolution 520 did not do — and could not do, because jurisdiction rests with Congress — was resolve the overlapping jurisdiction between Central Bank and CVM in the case of return distribution. The regulator itself acknowledges that the 519/520/521 package operates without the prudential complement that would come with the approved Bill 4.308. Without Article 13-E, any issuer that decides to pass on yield assumes bilateral regulatory risk: it can be questioned by the Central Bank under financial prudence lens and by the CVM under securities offering lens, without clear mediation between the two. This dual classification risk is what paralyzes the market.
Congress timing and the missed window
Market expectations, recorded by Valor Econômico at the beginning of the year, were for Bill 4.308 approval in the first half of 2026. That timeline is now largely compromised. Legislative priorities compete with fiscal agenda, regulatory tax reform, and LCI/LCA debates — agendas that, from a parliamentary calendar perspective, drain attention from the crypto topic.
The operational risk is as follows: if the Bill does not advance until October 2026, Central Bank Resolution 520 enters full operational regime operating without the prudential complement that the Central Bank itself acknowledges as necessary. Result: Brazilian issuers operate in regulatory limbo while USDT and USDC — which don't depend on the Bill for anything — continue gaining market share in the domestic market, now with formal PIX integration in the case of USDC.
The scenario without Article 13-E
Suppose Bill 4.308 advances, but with Article 13-E being defaced or removed — a real possibility given that lobbying by traditional investment funds has interest in maintaining monopoly over yield distribution in fixed income to retail. In that scenario, the result is simple and known:
- Real stablecoins continue functioning as a payment method, but lose any chance of attracting relevant working capital balance (which goes to CDB, Treasury Selic, or traditional DI fund).
- Issuers operating with indirect yield model (Crown, Bloquo) continue operating with parallel products, technically legal but structurally complex.
- USDC with PIX integration and USDT continue gaining market share in Brazil because they offer what is, today, the best available operational proposal: perceived backing, global liquidity, progressive integration with local rails. Embedded Selic returns become, ironically, an advantage of the dollar — because USDT allows dollar custody with exchange protection, while the real stablecoin offers real exposure without yield pass-through.
- DREX enters as the preferred infrastructure of the State and traditional banking system, occupying the institutional niche. Private real stablecoins get squeezed between DREX (above) and USDT/USDC (laterally), without differentiated value proposition.
This is not a pessimistic scenario — it is the base scenario if Article 13-E does not pass. The Brazilian ecosystem of private stablecoins in local currency survives as an auxiliary payment method, but definitively loses the race to become a mass financial product.
Why this matters for fintechs, banks, and managers
The effect of Bill 4.308 does not remain restricted to the stablecoin market. Three relevant secondary effects:
- Corporate treasury: Brazilian companies that today keep cash sitting in current account or apply in DI fund would have onchain alternative with comparable return and instant liquidity. For companies with 24/7 operations (digital retail, marketplaces, payment gateways), the operational gain is measurable.
- Competition with CDB and Treasury Selic: mid-sized banks that today capture via CDB paying Selic minus 0.5% to 1% would lose part of their funding base to real stablecoins with passed-on yield. Competitive pressure would force repricing in retail fixed income — a phenomenon that regulators and banking treasuries monitor carefully.
- Cross-border flow management: exporters and companies with multi-currency revenue would gain internal hedging tool via real stablecoins with yield, rather than relying on traditional banking FX. The effect on FX spread for SMEs can be significant.
The international context: why Brazil is a unique case
Globally, the debate on yield-bearing stablecoins gained traction in 2025 following the advance of the GENIUS Act in the United States and the entry into force of MiCA in Europe, but in both cases the marginal gain of passing on Treasury yield (4-5%) is limited. In Brazil, Selic at 14.75% and accumulated inflation create what economists call a robust positive real wedge — ample space between capital opportunity cost and available nominal return rate. It is precisely this wedge that makes yield pass-through in Brazil economically transformative, not cosmetic.
The parallel with what Argentina did via CNV Resolution 1069 on tokenization is instructive: the neighbor doesn't have Brazilian Selic, but advanced on more regulatory fronts in less time. Brazil has Selic and still doesn't have the framework. Whoever reaches the appropriate framework first receives a window for regional market capture — another reason for Bill 4.308 to come out of limbo.
ON3X perspective
Article 13-E of Bill 4.308 is the silent inflection point of Brazilian crypto regulation. It doesn't have the glamour of exchange regulation, doesn't attract headlines like CBDC, doesn't polarize like the taxation debate. But it decides, in practice, whether private digital real has a future as a relevant financial product or becomes a footnote in the Central Bank's innovation section.
First, it is a clear reading for the market: Selic at 14.75% transforms yield-bearing real stablecoins from incremental opportunity into structural value proposition. Whoever reaches the market with regulated product and passed-on yield captures treasury balance, captures retail migrating from CDB, and captures companies that need onchain operational hedge. Whoever arrives late competes for marginal share in the payment method space.
Second, it is a warning for issuers: the window for Bill 4.308 approval with Article 13-E preserved depends on coordinated action among the crypto ecosystem, fintech associations, ABCripto and sectors that benefit from the development of tokenized infrastructure (tokenized agribusiness, institutional RWA, payment fintechs). Organized lobbies in the opposite direction — traditional funds, banks without stablecoin strategy, part of the securities industry — have historical presence in Congress. The counterweight needs to exist, and exist now.
Third, it is tactical reading for investors: it is worth closely following which issuers are technically ready to implement passed-on yield on approval day. Mercado Bitcoin (BRL1), Avenia (BRLA), and Bloquo appear as candidates with publicly aligned thesis. Transfero (BRZ) operates a distinct model and will likely maintain current positioning. The market will segment — and the first moves will dictate the ranking of the next five years of private digital real in Brazil.
ON3X will continue monitoring Bill 4.308's proceedings in the Chamber, the Central Bank's technical positioning on any potential new regulatory phase, and commercial moves by Brazilian issuers as the legislative window advances or closes. In any scenario, this is the regulatory topic with the greatest microstructural impact on the Brazilian crypto market in 2026 — and deserves exactly the level of attention the fiscal calendar receives.